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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how freelancers’ use of 
signals predicts earnings in online labor markets. 
Extant literature has questioned the usefulness of 
some assessment signals to evaluate a freelancer’s 
quality. We find that conventional signals – signals 
based on non-verifiable information – can be 
predictors of higher revenue, when they are based on 
anecdotes of positive past events (self-promotion). 
However, mere kindness and flattery towards the 
customer (ingratiation) is negatively associated with 
a freelancers’ earnings in OLM. Moreover, we find 
evidence that the number of tests performed on the 
platform is significantly associated with higher 
earnings - with each test that is added to the profile a 
freelancer‘s revenue increases by 4.1 %. We base our 
analysis on a sample of 1065 freelancers using 
objective financial earnings data, independent 
codings and survey data. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
There has been a growing number of research on 
“online labor markets” (OLM), online platforms for 
individuals and organizations “to quickly identify 
short-term workers who have skills required for 
particular, often one-time, tasks” [1]. However, as 
contracts are negotiated very quickly, independent of 
time and space and with minimized personal contact, 
increased information asymmetry yields insecurity 
regarding the hiring process. Thus, clients have to 
rely on diverse factors and cues to judge if a 
particular freelancer is likely to perform well.  
A prominent factor are signals visible on a 
freelancer’s profile page. Signaling is a process in 
which “one party (termed the agent) credibly conveys 
some information about itself [through different 
signals] to another party (the principal)” [2]. This 
information in the form of signals is costly. Costs 
associated with sending the signal outweigh the 
benefits of sending if the sender does not possess the 
respective qualities [3]. In turn, costly signals may 
reduce information asymmetry and are assumed to be 
beneficial for forming contractual relationships thus 
resulting in higher earnings and revenue for the 
freelancer.  
Accordingly, signaling literature has focused on 
the performance impact of signals in different 
markets and contexts, such as markets of public 
goods [4], the job market [3], the stock market [5] 
and the consumer market [6]. There are some studies 
in extant literature that have applied signaling theory 
to online labor markets. Signals assessed by this 
literature stream include the number of portfolio 
items [7], and the presence of a top rated status [8 - 
9]. However, for some signals, such as ratings, 
literature mentions an upward bias and the ability to 
reduce information asymmetry is questionable [10 - 
11].  
To date, extant literature in online labor markets 
has focused on “assessment signals” - verifiable and 
costly information, that can be directly validated by 
the receiver, such as ratings, tests and portfolio-items 
[12]. However, in highly competitive environments 
like online labor markets, freelancers do not solely 
rely on these types of signals to attract customers and 
stand out from the crowd.  
In fact, freelancers make extensive use of so 
called “conventional signals” [12] that express 
intentions, anecdotes and opinions of the sender, such 
as self-promotion - an individual’s claims to possess 
certain qualities. In contrast to assessment signals, 
these signals are not costly and cannot be directly 
validated. Surprisingly, literature on online labor 
markets has largely neglected conventional signals 
and their implications. Additionally, recent studies on 
assessment signaling neglect the fact that there might 
be other factors involved in signaling such as 
character traits and skills. To fill this gap, this study 
addresses the following research question:  
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How do assessment signals and conventional 
signals affect freelancers’ performance?  We assess 
the financial dimension of buyer supply exchanges – 
a freelancer’s total earnings in USD for a period of 
one year – to reflect freelancers’ performance [13-
14]. Measuring the earnings as a proxy of freelancing 
success has major benefits compared to other success 
measures, e.g., a natural unit that is easily interpreted, 
less bias than single source or dyadic data and the 
approximation of many dimensions of success in a 
single measure (customer satisfaction as well as 
successful management and sales activities) [15]. 
Additionally, we go beyond the level of visible 
signals and assess individual character traits – 
habitual patterns of behavior that are stable over time 
[16] and key skills / individual differences that might 
affect performance in OLM. Moreover, we add other 
variables that are likely to influence a freelancer’s 
earnings, such as a freelancer’s availability, past 
project experience, education level and english verbal 
proficiency. 
Our study contributes to extant literature in three 
ways. First, this study is the first to contrast 
conventional signals with assessment signals in 
online labor markets and shows that their 
performance implications differ. Thus, the research 
broadens the spectrum of signaling theory and opens 
up new avenues for OLM research. It helps to better 
understand the complexity of signaling behavior in 
OLM and offers various new signaling types future 
research could use to better assess performance in 
OLM. At the same time, we enable clients to infer 
crucial job related factors and improve their hiring 
decisions.  
Second, we build our analysis on earnings, an 
outcome measure that is largely neglected in OLM 
research. Accordingly, we extend literature by 
pointing to possible differences between hiring 
decisions and financial outcomes as a proxy for 
performance in OLM. 
Third, stressing the differences between signaling 
types contributes to research and practice on the 
design of OLM platforms, e.g., the optimal position 
of signaling spots (e.g., test scores, self-descriptions) 
on profile pages according to their relevance.  
We obtain self-report measures of character traits, 
objective measures of performance and various 
assessment signals as well as measures of 
conventional signals as perceived by third raters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
2. Literature review  
 
2.1. Online labor markets and related fields 
 
In information science, particularly in economics and 
accounting, there is an emerging body of literature on 
online labor markets, defined as online “tool for 
individuals and organizations to quickly identify 
short-term workers [- freelancers -] who have skills 
required for particular, often one-time, tasks.” [1].  
Thus, freelancing in the light of this study is the 
completion of major or minor business tasks by an 
individual in an online market place – the online 
labor market. The most important pillars of 
freelancing in online labor markets are the online 
representation of the freelancer by a profile page and 
the creation of an online reputation (e.g., via reviews 
and past jobs). Valuable candidates are virtually 
assessed and interviewed to work on jobs and 
complete project milestones. Thus, the activities 
within the entire project value chain are conducted 
digitally [14]. Some examples for major online labor 
markets are freelancer.com and upwork.com. A 
closely related concept is crowdsourcing, the “act of 
a company or institution taking a function once 
performed by employees and outsourcing it to an 
undefined (and generally large) network of people in 
the form of an open call” [17]. However, 
crowdsourcing emphasizes collaboration and 
problem-solving, often through “contests” [18] or 
“micro tasks” [19 - 20].  
There has been a growing body of literature in the 
field of online labor markets. Studies in this field 
have focused on the differences regarding classical,  
“offline” labor markets, such as female hiring biases 
[21], country preferences [22], language, time-zone 
and cultural differences [23], and auction 
preferences, such as the influence of bid format -
sealed and closed bids - on buyer surplus [24]. There 
has been some literature on signaling in online labor 
markets, which we will review in the following 
chapters. We will organize the review by the type of 
signal – namely assessment and conventional signals 
– and review studies on both antecedents and 
outcomes of signals.  
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2.2. Signaling in online labor markets 
 
Recall that signaling is defined as a process in which 
“one party (termed the agent) credibly conveys some 
information about itself [through different signals] to 
another party (the principal)” [2]. Central to the 
concept of signaling is the cost associated with a 
signal. Spence [3] discussed an individual’s 
education as a reliable signal because low performing 
individuals are not able to (successfully) obtain 
higher education and thus lack the ability to 
successfully send it. In other words, in the case of 
education, the costs associated with the signal 
outweigh the benefits for individuals that are not 
likely to succeed. The same is true for tests that can 
be taken on freelancing sites and are displayed 
publicly. Tests are a costly signal, because producing 
the signal without having the skills to take the test 
would not have benefits for the sender (a bad result is 
displayed on the page). We term these types of 
signals “assessment signals” – signals that are 
“reliable, because producing the signal requires 
possessing the indicated quality” [12]. The same is 
true for a freelancer’s ratings and portfolio items. 
Showing portfolio items – samples of past projects - 
would not be beneficial for the client if he or she has 
not been able to successfully perform his tasks in the 
past. If past projects did not end successfully or did 
not produce any outcome, showing portfolio items 
would not be beneficial or impossible. In general, 
portfolio items are directly verifiable as they are 
connected to a certain contract in the past. For an 
overview of assessment signals used in our study, see 
table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Assessment signals, definitions and 
examples from our dataset 
Signal Definition Example 
Tests The number of passed 
knowledge tests as 
displayed on each profile 
site. 
Number of 
passed tests for 
different 
Levels of PHP.  
Portfolio 
items 
Number of work 
samples displayed on the 
profile page.  
Links to 
webpages, etc.  
Rating  Average review score of 
all projects completed, 
range 1-5.  
4.85 Stars 
 
In contrast to assessment signals, conventional 
signals do not require the sender to possess the 
quality signaled, rather, “the link between signal and 
quality is arbitrary, a matter of social convention” 
[12]. In other words, anyone could use e.g., his self-
description to tell people about positive past events 
and his desirable qualities (self-promotion) or act like 
a favorable person by using flattery and being overly 
polite (ingratiation). Another conventional signal 
often used in OLM is the price of a product – only 
social mores or conventions prohibit freelancers to 
demand a higher price for their services. For an 
overview of the conventional signals used in our 
study, see table 2. 
 
Table 2. Conventional signals, definitions and 
examples from our dataset 
Signal Definition Example 
Self-
Promotion  
Self-promotion 
signals aim to show 
that the subject/ 
actor has desirable 
qualities necessary 
for the job through 
anecdotes of past 
events [25]. 
 “In the past, I 
have 
successfully 
finished many 
projects based 
on Pearl, Java 
and PHP, e.g., 
X, Y, Z.” 
Ingratiation Ingratiation is a 
signal intended to 
evoke interpersonal 
liking and 
attraction between 
the freelancer and 
the client [26].  
“I am always 
available to 
find ways we 
can effectively 
achieve your 
desired goals.”  
Price  The average price 
freelancers display 
on their profile 
page.  
 65 $ / hr 
 
2.2.1. Assessment signals in OLM literature 
 
Recall that we have defined assessment signals as 
reliable, costly signals that can be directly validated 
by the receiver. We have pointed out earlier that we 
already observe a broad variety of literature on 
different types of assessment signals. Some studies 
have assessed the antecedents of assessment signals, 
such as skills [27], market threats and market 
concentration [28], contract type, motives [1] and 
various demographics [29  -30]. To date, research has 
not assessed the role of character traits regarding 
assessment signaling in online labor markets.  
There are already some studies in extant literature 
that have applied signaling theory to explain online 
platform outcomes. Some of these studies have 
assessed the influence of assessment signals on 
performance outcomes such as consumers’ 
willingness to transact [31] and perceptions of 
product quality [32]. An outcome studied widely in 
OLM literature are hiring decisions. Assessment 
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signals addressed by this literature stream include the 
presence of an agency affiliation [33], the number of 
portfolio pieces [7], and the presence of a top rated 
status [8-9]. However, to our knowledge, there is no 
study assessing financial performance outcomes of 
signals in online labor markets.  
2.2.2. Conventional signals in OLM literature 
We have described earlier that conventional signals 
are not based on verifiable information and thus 
cannot be directly validated. These signals have been 
the subject of studies on impression management in 
an offline environment such as hiring, interviews and 
evaluations [34 - 37]. Research on antecedents of 
conventional signals in information science literature 
is scarce. However, a few articles indirectly referring 
to the use of conventional signals are concerned with 
outcome measures such as “envy” [38], “first 
impression bias” [39], “online isomorphism” [40] and 
“swift guanxi” – the creation of intimacy perceptions 
[41]. This stream does not differentiate between 
certain tactics and thus applies a unidimensional 
approach to conventional signaling. Research 
regarding the outcomes of conventional signals 
includes the effect of viewing social media profiles 
on subjective well-being and self-esteem [42 - 43] or 
evaluations of others [44 – 45]. In summary, it still 
remains unclear how conventional signaling in social 
media, particularly in online labor markets, is linked 
to individual work-related success measures. 
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
3.1. Performance implications of signals 
 
According to signaling theory, information 
asymmetry between two parties can be reduced by 
sending costly market-related signals, which in turn, 
makes an existing contractual relationship more 
viable and helps to attract new customers [46-47]. 
Specifically, the freelancer needs to decide whether 
and how to provide relevant information toward a 
customer, who in turn interprets these signals [48].  
Recall that assessment signals are difficult to be 
imitated by competitors and are only beneficial for 
the sender if he or she possesses the qualities to be 
signaled. Assessment signals require high costs and 
risks from the freelancer to transfer the signal in 
absence of authenticity [49]. Thus, these signals 
reduce information asymmetry through credible 
information such as portfolio items and tests and 
positively affect the freelancer – client relationship. 
Signals assessed within this category, are the increase 
of CEOs’ ownership stakes to promote diversification 
strategies [50], the stack of a firm’s board with 
prominent directors to signal legitimacy [51] and the 
establishment of heterogeneous boards to signal 
compliance with social values [52, 48].  
In our case, the OLM provides some 
opportunities to engage in assessment signaling: 
References in the form of portfolio items, a quality 
rating provided by past customers and tests to 
showcase a freelancer’s knowledge. In the light of 
signaling theory, all these signals should be costly 
and “hard to fake” and thus reliable indicators of true 
positive qualities. Thus, information asymmetry 
should be decreased which is beneficiary for sales 
and ultimately increases a freelancer’s overall 
success measured by his earnings [14]. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H1a: There is a positive association of the number of 
portfolio items with earnings. 
 
H1b: There is a positive association of a freelancer’s 
rating displayed on the page with earnings. 
 
H1c: The number of tests displayed on the profile 
page is positively associated with a freelancer’s 
earnings. 
 
Unlike assessment signals, conventional signals 
are not directly linked to specific qualities, high costs 
and verifiable information. In contrast, only social 
conventions and mores (e.g., terms of conduct) may 
prevent the sender from providing exaggerated or 
false information. However, these “costs” are not 
high enough to guarantee honesty of the sender [12]. 
Consequently, research has assumed that these 
signals may be less reliable concerning the true 
qualities of the signaling-subject [49]. 
However, this rationale may not be universally 
true for all types of conventional signals. In contrast, 
consumer studies have shown that some conventional 
signals may increase short term sales performance. 
Advertising industry tries to convince potential 
customers by telling “success stories” including 
brand and store information [53]. Thus, we propose 
that some conventional signals might increase 
earnings if the customer associates them with 
beneficial facts about the freelancer. One such signal 
is a product’s price, where a higher price incorporates 
notions of higher quality [53]. Likewise, self-
promotion – tactics that are used to create positive 
associations through anecdotes of past achievements 
– may also lead to a reduction of information 
asymmetry and increase credibility. We base this 
proposition on the fact that anecdotes of past 
achievements – especially in a freelancing 
Page 3458
environment that is mainly concerned with 
knowledge work - require at least some knowledge 
about the underlying techniques and thus incorporate 
reliable elements. In other words, freelancers with 
insufficient knowledge about the underlying 
techniques may not be able to form suitable 
anecdotes. 
However, for freelancers engaging strongly in 
Ingratiation tactics - flattery behavior towards the 
customer – we do not expect a reduction in 
information asymmetry. In contrast, credibility is 
likely to decrease as a customer might get suspicious 
that the freelancer is trying to cover his negative 
qualities. This can be explained by attribution theory 
that deals with “how the social perceiver uses 
information to arrive at causal explanations for 
events” [54]. Attribution theory’s discounting 
principle states that contractors in OLM are likely to 
accurately discount ingratiation for the presence of 
plausible ulterior motives in the situation (e.g., trying 
to sell services). This discounting for ulterior motives 
ultimately results in lower perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the freelancer [55]. Thus, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H2a: The amount of ingratiation tactics use is 
negatively associated with a freelancer’s earnings. 
 
H2b: There is a positive association of the amount of 
self-promotion tactics with earnings. 
 
H2c: The price is positively associated with a 
freelancer’s earnings. 
 
3.2. Other factors affecting earnings 
 
Besides the signals described before, other factors 
are likely to affect earnings in OLM. One such factor 
are specific character traits that are correlated with 
entrepreneurial behavior and innovativeness. These 
traits have been shown to affect peoples’ behavior 
[56]. Five “cardinal traits” – also called the “Big 
Five” – have been defined in extant literature: 
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness and openness to experience [56]. 
Among these five traits, two have been shown to be 
good proxies for entrepreneurial behavior and 
innovativeness - extraversion and openness [57]. 
Moreover, the configuration of these traits might also 
affect how conventional signals are sent, e.g. research 
on social networks has shown that extroverted people 
tend to transfer their behavior from real to virtual life 
by providing information on profile pages differently 
and more extensive [42 - 45]. Thus, we will assess 
these traits as a moderator of the conventional signal 
– earnings relationship. Besides the influence of 
traits, the individual skill and experience set of the 
freelancer such as the level of verbal proficiency in 
english, the educational level, level of availability on 
the platform and past project experience - the number 
of past projects - might be an important determinant 
of earnings and are included as control measures. 
 
4. Method 
 
To assess the proposed relationships, we gather 
three types of data – survey data of traits, objective 
data of earnings, assessment signals and the price 
gained directly from a freelancing platform and 
independent codings of self-promotion and 
ingratiation.  
As a first step, we used web crawling technology 
to generate a list of 56.000 freelancers from a major 
freelancing platform. To ensure random sampling, 
the crawler used each of more than 3,000 fine grained 
skill-tags gathered from the platform to search for 
candidates and saved each freelancers’ publicly 
accessible information in an SQL database. To ensure 
that no duplicates are saved, respective code was 
added to the crawler. As a result, we were able to 
obtain a random database of over 56.000 unique 
freelancer profiles.  
In a second step, we drew a random sub-sample 
from the original list to generate candidates that 
received an invitation to take part in the survey. An 
incentive of $5 was given to reduce non-response 
bias. This procedure resulted in 1174 completed 
questionnaires. We repeated the crawling process for 
the earnings measure after one year and were able to 
gain earnings data from all past projects a freelancer 
engaged in for the period of one year after the first 
measurement. This procedure enabled us to spot 
inactive users or fake profiles. 
After merging survey and objective data, we 
obtained independent codings from three judges that 
rated each freelancer’s signaling behavior based on 
their self-descriptions posted on the profile page. Our 
obtained dataset was reduced as we excluded (a) 
inactive users (b) suspended / deleted users (c) users 
lacking a rating (d) users with incomplete 
information. The final dataset included 1065 users. 
 
4.1. Sample 
 
Our final sample of 1,065 freelancers contains 
29% females and 71 % males. The major proportion 
– 39% - of freelancers contained in the sample were 
located in the indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh etc.), the second largest proportion was 
Asia (22%) while 16% accounted for developed 
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countries (Western Europe, Australia, USA) and 15% 
for Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Baltic 
States etc.), 9% were freelancers from other regions. 
Regarding the educational level, 52% of the 
freelancers had an undergraduate degree, 32 % hold a 
graduate degree with 1.4 % holding a postgraduate 
and 7.9 % holding high school or lower degree, 6.5% 
had another type of degree. Descriptive statistics of 
other variables included in our model are depicted in 
table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean SD 
 
N 
Earnings 2383.66 4930.35 1065 
Tests 3.04 4.74 1065 
Rating 4.84 .32 1065 
Price 14.42 11.96 1065 
Availability 4.51 .75 1065 
Ingratiation 2.04 1.02 1065 
Self-promotion 3.08 .92 1065 
Portfolio items 7.39 13.64 1065 
Project 
Experience 22.84 29.15 1065 
 
4.2. Measures 
 
To assess earnings, we collected the job history 
of each freelancer in our final sample containing jobs 
started from January 2015 – January 2016. In a 
second step we aggregated the earnings over each 
freelancer, thus transforming wide project level to 
individual level data. Accordingly, we were able to 
collect earnings information for each freelancer for 
the year after the signaling information and all other 
measures were collected. 
Moreover, we collected the project experience in 
terms of the number of projects completed on the 
platform for each freelancer and the self-rated 
availability of the freelancer on the platform (likert 
scale ranging from 1-5 with 5 referring to the highest 
measure of availability on the site). 
The trait measures reflect existing scales 
developed in prior research and were assessed on the 
basis of the big five personality traits—openness to 
experience and extraversion. For this purpose, we 
used the non-reverse coded items of the standard IPIP 
scale for extraversion (5 items) and  
openness (7 items) [56]. Sample items include “I am 
the life of the party.” (extraversion) and “I have a 
vivid imagination.” (openness). Subjects were asked 
how well these items described them on a 7 point 
likert scale ranging from “(1) strongly disagree” to 
“(7) strongly agree”. Cronbach’s alpha was above .7 
for all items. 
Self-promotion and Ingratiation signals were 
measured through independent coding of the self-
descriptions present on each freelancer’s profile page. 
The coding is conducted by three independent coders 
applying the consensual assessment technique 
described by Amabile [58]. Building on the 
respective definitions (see Table 2), coders were 
trained to rate each self-description regarding the 
intensity of the form of signaling behavior from (1) 
not at all to (7) very intense. Thus, we gained each 
coder’s scores for each freelancer. We calculated the 
respective average ICC measure. All ICC values 
were above the value of .6 suggesting good overall 
consistency of the codings allowing us to average 
them to a single measure. The number of tests, the 
rating, the number of portfolio items and the price are 
obtained directly from the profile pages as objective 
measures.  
 
4.3. Analysis 
 
As we had to deal with a count outcome variable, 
parametric tests, such as linear regression are not 
sufficient. In contrast, poisson regression models and 
negative binomial models better approximate a right 
skewed distribution as present in count outcomes. As 
the dispersion parameter exceeded the value of 0 in 
all our models and deviance exceeded critical cut off 
levels, we concluded that negative binomial 
regression is more sufficient to test our hypotheses 
than poisson regression. To better interpret our 
findings we calculated the Exp(b) coefficients. The 
latter represent odds-ratios that can be interpreted by 
multiplying them with the DV to approximate the 
effect of a one-unit IV increase. Thus, any value 
>1.00 represents a positive impact and every value 
<1.00 indicates a negative impact on the outcome 
variable. 
 
5. Results 
 
The results of our regression model can be found 
in Table 4. As expected, we can observe significant 
positive effects of individual differences such as 
english verbal proficiency (english level) and number 
of completed projects. The degree of availability of 
the freelancer on the site was also significantly 
related to higher earnings. Moreover, we observed 
significant country differences for freelancers from 
Asia (Exp(b) = 2.739, p= .000) and India (Exp(b) = 
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1.675, p=.029). However, we observed no direct 
effect of traits and no moderating effects leading us 
to discard the moderation model.  
 
Table 4: Effect of skills, traits and signals on 
freelancers’ 1-year earnings in USD – negative 
binomial regression.1 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls    
Availability 1.356*** 1.375*** 1.545*** 
Experience 1.020*** 1.020** 1.020*** 
Education    
[No Degree] .134 .119 .190 
[High School] 1.080 1.004 1.143 
[Bachelor] .845 .822 .778 
[Master] 1.094 1.095 .889 
[Doctorate] .692 .576 .485 
    
Country    
[India] 1.315 1.272 1.675* 
[Asia] 1.992** 1.949** 2.739*** 
[Developed] 1.637 1.621 1.220 
[East Europe] 1.862* 1.748* 1.590 
    
Gender .806 .809 1.021 
English Level 1.575** 1.582** 1.557** 
Traits    
Extraversion 
 
.933 .921 
Openness 
 
.921 1.009 
Signals    
Portfolio 
  
.991* 
Rating 
  
.978 
Tests 
  
1.041** 
Ingratiation 
  
.873* 
Self-Promotion 
  
1.277*** 
Price 
  
1.047*** 
N 1,065 1,065 1,065 
Dispersion P.. 3.591 3.580 3.412 
df 13 2 6 
delta -2LL 120.76*** 4.68 (n.s) 74.14 *** 
 
Significance levels: ***p<.001   ** p < .01  * p< .05 
1 Exp(B) values are displayed. Education, Country and 
Gender are dummy coded, baseline groups: Other 
education, other country and male. 
 
Inspection of the -2LL ratio deltas reveals that 
signals add explanative value compared to Model 1. 
However, H1a and H1b could not be confirmed in 
our analysis. Besides an initially (weak) positive 
correlation (r=.061, p=.04), portfolio items had a 
slightly negative significant impact on earnings. At 
the same time the variable was correlated with past 
experience (r=.354, p<.01). Thus, we assume a 
suppression effect of past experience. Moreover, we 
find no significant influence of the rating on a 
freelancer’s earnings. However, as seen in table 3 
(mean rating = 4.84), a possible explanation of this 
non-finding could be upward biases present in OLM 
– we will elaborate further on that in the discussion 
section. 
H1c was confirmed showing a significant positive 
effect of adding tests on earnings. Accordingly – as 
shown by the odds ratio in Table 4, adding one test to 
the profile increases earnings by 4.1 %. 
For H2a – the negative influence of ingratiation - 
we can observe a significant negative effect, leading 
us to accept the hypothesis. H2b and H2c were 
confirmed: Self-promotion tactics and increased price 
showed a significant positive association with 
earnings.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our analysis shows that self-promotion, price and 
the number of tests taken by a freelancer are valid 
predictors of a freelancer’s performance in terms of 
1-year earnings in OLM. For ingratiation tactics – 
flattery behavior towards the customer – we see a 
negative effect on earnings. We find no significant 
earnings impact of the freelancers’ rating. Prior 
research on hiring decisions has pointed to a potential 
upward bias in ratings reducing their effect on 
information asymmetry and ultimately their 
predictive validity in terms of performance. We can 
particularly confirm this finding through our analysis. 
Before risking a bad rating and potential reputation 
flaws, freelancers may offer their clients to reduce the 
charge in exchange for a good rating. Thus, its ability 
to reduce information asymmetry decreases. 
However, we find other signals to be positively 
associated with earnings.  
First, we propose that customers should more 
carefully look at less structured signals that 
freelancers send via their profile pages, especially in 
self-descriptions. In fact, the use of self-promotion 
tactics – a conventional signal – shows a significant 
positive impact on performance in terms of 1-year 
earnings. With every unit increase of self-promotion, 
the odds-ratio suggests earnings to rise by 27%. 
However, if conventional signaling is based on 
ingratiation tactics, such as flattery, we find a 
negative association with earnings - a unit increase in 
Page 3461
ingratiation lowers the earnings by 13%. In a 
supplementary analysis, we let three independent 
coders judge each freelancer according to their 
overall impression of credibility on a 7-point scale 
using consensual assessment as described in the 
method section (“According to your impression, how 
credible do you think this freelancer is?”, ICC > .6). 
We found that credibility showed a significant 
positive correlation with self-promotion (r= .38, p= 
.000). These findings support our argument that the 
way people describe themselves seems to matter in 
OLM, particularly for the successful formation of 
contracts and freelancing success – even if these 
descriptions are not directly verifiable. Thus, in 
search for suitable freelancers, customers should pay 
attention to self-descriptions and the conventional 
signaling tactics employed. 
Second, the suppression effect of experience on 
portfolio items shows that the project experience on 
the platform is a driver of earnings rather than 
references shown on the profile page.  
Third, we find that the number of tests taken by a 
freelancer is significantly associated with higher 
earnings - adding a test score to the profile is 
associated with a 4.1% increase in earnings. This 
finding points to the number of knowledge tests 
performed by a freelancer as a viable measure for 
assessment.  
The finding that a higher price is associated with 
higher earnings could be interpreted twofold: On the 
one hand, price is a natural driver of higher earnings. 
On the other hand, in our dataset, price was explicitly 
measured as a signal (the price displayed on top of 
the page). This price is not identical to the average 
price of past projects. This opens up avenues for 
further research on the role of price as a signal in 
OLM.  
Moreover, future studies could include the 
assessment of long term financial data through 
methods such as time series and add dyadic 
performance evaluations of customers to capture a 
broader variety of performance measures. It was not 
the focus of the current study to assess the influence 
of character traits on the choice of signals. However, 
it might be promising for future research to extend 
the set of character trait and skill variables that might 
affect how freelancers send signals in OLM. 
Regarding the role of character traits, we propose that 
future research might apply different assessment 
techniques apart from self-rated measures. Though 
we used a major freelancing platform with a high 
market share, we were restricted to a single platform 
to assess our model. Future research could extend the 
model to other platforms or combine multiple 
platforms. Last but not least, the assessment of self-
descriptions did not allow us to assess defensive or 
reactive signals, such as disclaimers. Thus, future 
research could extend the range of conventional 
signals and assessment signals to include defensive 
signaling tactics. 
Our research leads to different implications: We 
enable freelancers to better market their services by 
showing the potential and bandwidth of various types 
of signals – especially conventional signals. At the 
same time, clients may infer crucial job-related 
factors from signaling activities to improve their 
hiring decisions. Last but not least, our research has 
implications for the design of OLM platforms in 
terms of optimizing the positioning of signaling 
opportunities on the site according to their relevance. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we assessed alternative predictors of 
performance in OLM. In summary, we show, that 
both forms of signals - assessment as well as 
conventional signals – show the potential to reduce 
information asymmetry in OLM. Among others, the 
number of knowledge tests passed by the freelancer 
and the amount of self-promotion seem to predict 
performance in terms of increased 1-year earnings 
and may guide customers’ decisions for hiring 
freelancers in online labor markets. In contrast, we 
find initial evidence that ingratiation tactics, such as 
flattery towards the customer, are negatively 
associated with earnings. 
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